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OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge.

Appellants, the Presbytery of New Jersey of the
Orthodox Presbyterian Church ("Presbytery"), the Calvary Orthodox
Presbyterian Church of Wildwood ("Calvary") and Reverend David B.

Cummings ("Cummings"), a clergyman of the Orthodox Presbyterian
denomination (collectively "plaintiffs"), appeal an order of the
district court dismissing their complaint.1

Plaintiffs assert

recent amendments to the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
(the "LAD" or "Act"), N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 10:5-1 to 10:5-42 (West
1993 & Supp. 1994), violate the First Amendment right to freedom
of speech.

The amendments they question added to the category of

impermissible distinctions "affectional or sexual orientation" to
the statute's ban on certain forms of discrimination.

Relying on

a responsible state official's affidavit that the state would not
enforce the LAD against Calvary or Presbytery as churches or
Cummings as a church pastor, the district court held that the
case was not ripe.
We conclude, however, that the controversy is ripe
because Cummings arguably alleges the statute threatens his right
as an individual citizen to speak out against male and female
homosexual acts and the state has expressly refused to offer any
assurance it will not prosecute Cummings if he does so outside
his church.

The same, however, is not true of the institutional

church plaintiffs, Presbytery and Calvary.

Accordingly, we will

reverse the district court's order and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion in so far as its order

1

. The caption in this case lists James Florio as the Governor
of New Jersey. After it was filed, Christine Todd Whitman was
elected to that office, but there has not yet been a substitution
of parties. The failure to amend the caption in this respect
does not affect this appeal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1). We
note the change for purposes of clarification only.

applies to Reverend Cummings.

We will, however affirm the

district court's dismissal without prejudice of this action as it
pertains to the institutional plaintiffs.

I.
In April 1992, the plaintiffs brought this suit to
enjoin enforcement of recent amendments to the LAD which had
added "affectional or sexual orientation" to the personal traits
or characteristics generally protected against discrimination in
public accommodations,2 employment and housing.
Ann. §§ 10:5-4, 10:5-12 (West Supp. 1994).

See N.J. Stat.

The statute also

prohibits "aid[ing], abet[ting], incit[ing], compel[ing] or
coerc[ing]" others into violations of its prohibitions against
discrimination.

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(e); see N.J. Stat.

Ann. § 10:5-12(n).

The plaintiffs originally challenged these

and other provisions as an infringement on the First Amendment
right to the free exercise of religion and association as well as
the right to freedom of speech.

On May 15, 1992, they filed a

motion for a preliminary injunction and on May 22, filed an
amended complaint.

On June 11, 1992, the state filed a motion

for summary judgment along with a motion for dismissal.

The

district court heard oral argument but denied the motion for a
preliminary injunction holding that the plaintiffs failed to
2

. Public accommodations are defined quite broadly in N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 10:5-5(l). They include, but are not limited to, taverns,
hotels, trailer camps, day camps, health facilities, stores and
other retail establishments, restaurants, public conveyances,
movie theaters, pool halls, schools, etc. See id.

establish both a likelihood of success on the merits and
irreparable harm.

The plaintiffs appealed to this Court and on

December 14, 1992, we affirmed the district court in an
unpublished memorandum opinion.

Presbytery of New Jersey v.

Florio, No. 92-5339, slip. op. at 13 (3d Cir. Dec. 14, 1992)
("Presbytery I"), see 983 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1992) (Table).
Because of the state's affidavit stating its intention not to
enforce the Act against religious institutions, we held that the
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the possibility of immediate and
irreparable harm.

Id. at 9-10.

We also held that the

possibility of private enforcement of the Act by activist
homosexual groups was too remote to constitute an immediate
threat of potential harm and, in any event, the private parties
would not be bound by the injunction sought.

Id. at 10-12.

We

specifically refused to comment on the district court's
discussion of the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the
merits.

Id. at 13.
Following our decision, the district court heard

argument on the state's Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.

The

state argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing, the case was
not ripe and that the federal court should abstain under Railroad
Commission of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941).

The

district court granted the state's motion and dismissed the
complaint.

Presbytery of New Jersey v. Florio, 830 F. Supp. 241

(D.N.J. 1993) ("Presbytery II").

It held that the case was not

ripe, based on the state's affidavit that it would not enforce
the Act against the institutional plaintiffs as churches or

Cummings in his capacity as a clergyman of the Orthodox
Presbyterian Church.

Id. at 248-50.3

The plaintiffs filed a

timely notice of appeal.

II.
The LAD, originally enacted in 1945, prohibits
discrimination in employment, labor organization membership,
public accommodations and real estate, financial, and business
transactions.

In 1991, the New Jersey legislature added

"affectional or sexual orientation" to the personal
characteristics of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry,
age, sex, and marital status previously protected.4

Under the

3

. The court did not reach the issue of standing or Pullman
abstention.
4

.

The legislature's finding and declaration states:
The Legislature finds and declares that
practices of discrimination against any of
its inhabitants, because of . . . affectional
or sexual orientation . . . [is a] matter[]
of concern to the government of the State,
and that such discrimination threatens not
only the rights and proper privileges of the
inhabitants of the State but menaces the
institutions and foundation of a free
democratic State . . . .
. . .
The Legislature further finds that
because of discrimination, people suffer
personal hardships, and the State suffers a
grievous harm. . . . The Legislature intends
that such damages be available to all persons
protected by this act and that this act shall
be liberally construed in combination with
other protections available under the laws of
this State.

Act, it is unlawful for an employer "to refuse to hire or employ
or to bar or to discharge or require to retire" any individual on
the basis of a protected characteristic.

Id. § 10:5-12(a).

The

Act also prohibits the printing or circulating of any statement
which expresses, directly or indirectly, that employment
opportunities for persons with the protected characteristics will
be limited.

Id. § 10:5-12(c).

similarly restrained.

Public accommodations are

See id. § 10:5-12(f).

In addition, the

LAD makes it illegal for any individual to refuse to transact
business with individual groups who have any of the protected
characteristics.

Id. §§ 10:5-12(l), (m).

The Act also makes it

illegal "to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any
of the acts forbidden under this act, or to attempt to do so."
Id. § 10:5-12(e).

Still another section applying the Act's

prohibition against aiding, abetting, inciting or coercing
violations of subsection (l) and (m) specifically prohibits
incitements to boycott persons who belong to the protected
groups.

Id. § 10:5-12(n)(2).

Finally, the Act requires owners

of public accommodations and employers to post public notices
informing employees and patrons of their rights under the Act.
Id. § 10:5-12(j).
The Act exempts religious organizations from compliance
in the selection of their own employees and it permits religious
organizations to restrict rental or use of their own property to
(..continued)
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-3 (West Supp. 1994).

members of their own faith.

Id. §§ 10:5-12(a), 10:5-5(n).

The

Act does not apply to private clubs or facilities for religious
education.

Id. § 10:5-5(l).
The state itself may enforce the Act's civil penalties

against violators.

An aggrieved individual may begin the process

of civil enforcement by filing a complaint with the state
Division on Civil Rights ("DCR") or proceeding directly to state
court.

Id. § 10:5-13 (West 1993).

The Act specifically grants

standing to sue to "[a]ny individual who has been discriminated
against" and "any organization which represents or acts to
further the interests of individuals who have been discriminated
against."

Id. § 10:5-38 (West 1993).

The successful plaintiff

may recover compensatory and punitive damages, fines, and
attorney fees.

Id. § 10:5-3; id. § 10:5-14.1a (West 1993); id.

§ 10:5-27.1 (West 1993).

The Act is to be liberally construed to

accomplish its purpose of eradicating the kinds of discrimination
it prohibits.

See id. § 10:5-3.

The Orthodox Presbyterian Church ("OPC") is a national
denomination with 170 member churches, including Calvary.

The

OPC split from the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) in 1936 over a
doctrinal difference.5

Presbytery is a New Jersey religious

corporation and the formal governing body of OPC churches in New

5

. The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) as well as a number of other
mainstream organized religions have filed a joint amicus brief
setting out their opposition to OPC's doctrinal views and
teachings. These amici support the state's position on the
merits of this case. Because we are only concerned with
jurisdiction on this appeal we do not decide the merits.

Jersey.

At the time plaintiffs initially filed their complaint,

the OPC had 2,113 members in New Jersey.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege the
following.

Based upon The Holy Bible and church doctrine, the

OPC teaches that homosexuality, bisexuality, and heterosexual sex
outside of marriage are grievous sins.

Plaintiffs also allege

that they
have always in the past, presently do and
since the 1992 amendments, have directly or
indirectly discriminated against and made
reasonable distinctions based upon
homosexuality, bisexuality and heterosexual
sex outside of marriage. For example, in New
Jersey the plaintiffs express, speak and
preach against homosexuality, adultery and
fornication, calling it variously an
abomination and sinful. . . . They also
disseminate and circulate such speech and
distinctions throughout New Jersey and the
world. . . . [T]hey even print and
disseminate materials condemning sexual
sins. . . . Plaintiffs, and their members,
also inquire about the sexual practices of
prospective employees and are continuing to
do so despite the existence of the 1992
amendments.

Complaint ¶ 49, Appellants' Appendix ("App.") at 217.

Cummings

and members of his congregation "speak out about homosexuality,
bisexuality and heterosexual sex outside of marriage, make
reasonable distinctions based on such practices, lobby against
them, and circulate literature condemning them.

They encourage,

aid and abet discrimination and reasonable distinctions against
homosexuals, bisexuals and heterosexuals engaging in sex outside
of marriage."

Id. ¶ 51, App. at 217-18.

Furthermore,

"[p]laintiffs have always in the past, presently do and since the
amendments have refused to knowingly buy from, contract with or
otherwise do business with persons on the basis of that person's
homosexual, bisexual or heterosexual practices."
at 220.

Id. ¶ 57, App.

Plaintiffs also "have always in the past, presently do

and since the amendments have refused to employ any individual
who is practicing any public sexual sin, including fornication,
adultery and homosexuality, and they make reasonable distinctions
based on such acts."

Id. ¶ 69, App. at 223.

Initially, plaintiffs contended that various elements
of the Act violated their First, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.

The allegedly offending sections included:

sections 10:5-12(a) and (c) (applicable to employers); section
10:5-12(f) (applicable to public accommodations); sections 10:512(e) and (n) (prohibition against aiding, abetting, or inciting
violations); section 10:5-12(j) (notice posting provision); and
sections 10:5-12(l) and (m) (prohibition of boycotts and refusal
to do business).
In response to plaintiffs' initial request for a
preliminary injunction, the Director of the DCR, C. Gregory
Stewart, filed an affidavit setting forth the DCR's and attorney
general's position on enforcement of the Act against religious
institutions.

The Stewart affidavit averred that the state did

not consider churches places of "public accommodations."

Thus,

the sections relating to public accommodations were inapplicable
to the institutional plaintiffs.

Stewart further stated that

churches were considered exempt in their hiring of internal
employees.

Due to "First Amendment concerns,"
the Division has not in the past prosecuted
and has no intention to prosecute [under
sections 10:5-12(c), (e), (f), (j), (l) &
(m)] essentially exempt churches for
sincerely-held religious belief or practice,
or speech consistent with such belief, or for
a refusal to engage in certain speech or for
following their religious tenets . . . .
Hence, the Division would not even attempt to
enforce those provisions in the circumstances
of sincerely-held religious reasons such as
plaintiffs express here. . . .

App. at 296.

Stewart also made the following general statement:
[I]t has been the consistent
construction and interpretation of the LAD
that, consonant with constitutional legal
barriers respecting legitimate belief and
free exercise protected by the First
Amendment, the State was not authorized to
regulate or control religious worship,
beliefs, governance, practice or liturgical
norms, even where ostensibly or colorably at
odds with any of the LAD prohibited
categories of discrimination.
. . .
Moreover, the Division has not and has no
intention to engage in any determination or
judgment as to what is or is not a "religious
activity" of a church, or to determine what
is or is not a "tenet" of religious faith.
Within First Amendment limits, all of
plaintiffs' claimed religiously-based free
exercises of faith are unthreatened by a
reasoned construction of the LAD consistent
with its meaning and long enforcement
history.

App. at 294-96.

The affidavit did not, however, disavow

enforcement against the members of the church for their public

activities nor does it preclude enforcement against Cummings for
his activities outside the Church.
In light of the Stewart affidavit and our prior
decision in Presbytery I, the parties agree that the scope of
their challenge on the merits to the Act has been significantly
limited.

The plaintiffs now challenge only section 10:5-12(e),

which makes it illegal "to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce"
forbidden acts, section 10:5-12(n), which makes it illegal "to
aid, abet, incite, compel, coerce or induce" boycotts or refusals
to do business and section 10:5-12(j), the notice posting
provision.

Presbytery II, 830 F. Supp. at 247; Brief of

Appellants at 6.

Plaintiffs argue that the first two sections

are impermissible restrictions on freedom of speech and the last
provision is a violation of the freedom of conscience and forced
speech.

Before the district court, however, the plaintiffs

conceded that in light of the representations of the DCR, the
sections have no applicability to the institutional plaintiffs
Presbytery and Calvary.

Id.

III.
If this case is ripe, and if any of the plaintiffs have
standing to assert their free speech claim, the district court
would have subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331,
1343 (West 1993) and 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201, 2202 (West 1994).

The

state contends, however, that the district court lacked
jurisdiction because the plaintiffs did not present an
Article III justiciable controversy.

The district court agreed

and dismissed the case on this ground.

Because the district

court did not reach the merits of the plaintiffs' claim, the
dismissal was without prejudice.6

The district court's order is,

however, a final resolution of the plaintiffs' claims and
therefore we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1291 (West 1993).
Our review of ripeness and standing determinations is
plenary.

Taylor Inv. Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township, 983 F.2d

1285, 1289 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 304 (1993); Roe v.
Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857, 863 (3d Cir. 1990).

IV.
The issue on this appeal is whether the plaintiffs have
presented a ripe controversy so that an Article III court may
assert jurisdiction.

We examine the merits of the claim only to

the extent necessary to determine whether there is any potential
for immediacy of harm.
Federal courts may only resolve actual "cases" and
"controversies."

See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.

The existence

of a case and controversy is a prerequisite to all federal
6

. Generally, when a district court dismisses a case without
prejudice, it is not a final order unless the party seeking
appeal has specifically elected to stand on the complaint as set
forth. See generally Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950,
951-52 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam). In a case such as this where
the district court has dismissed based on justiciability and it
appears that the plaintiffs could do nothing to cure their
complaint, the principle of Borelli does not apply. Cf. Green v.
Humphrey Elevator and Truck Co., 816 F.2d 877, 878 n.4 (3d Cir.
1987) (dismissal without prejudice does not destroy finality
where party cannot cure defect).

actions, including those for declaratory or injunctive relief.
See Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1967,
1974 (1993); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S.
667, 671 (1950).

"Concerns of justiciability go to the power of

the federal courts to entertain disputes, and to the wisdom of
their doing so.

We presume that federal courts lack jurisdiction

'unless "the contrary appears affirmatively from the record."'"
Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316 (1991) (quoting Bender v.
Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 (1986) (quoting
King Bridge Co. v. Otoe County, 120 U.S. 225, 226 (1887))).
The concepts of standing and ripeness are related.
Each is a component of the Constitution's limitation of the
judicial power to real cases and controversies.

Correct analysis

in terms of ripeness tells us when a proper party may bring an
action and analysis in terms of standing tells us who may bring
the action.

See Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Adams, 961 F.2d

405, 411 & nn. 12-13 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Erwin Chemerinsky,
Federal Jurisdiction 99 (1989) ("standing focuses on whether the
type of injury alleged is qualitatively sufficient to fulfill the
requirements of Article III and whether the plaintiff has
personally suffered that harm, whereas ripeness centers on
whether that injury has occurred yet").

Because these concepts

are so closely related, they can be confused or conflated.

"It

is sometimes argued that standing is about who can sue while
ripeness is about when they can sue, though it is of course true
that if no injury has occurred, the plaintiff can be told either
that she cannot sue, or that she cannot sue yet."

Smith v.

Wisconsin Dep't of Agriculture, Trade & Consumer Protection, 23
F.3d 1134, 1141 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original).

It is

the plaintiff's responsibility to allege facts that invoke the
court's jurisdiction.

Renne, 501 U.S. at 316.

The district court did not reach the issue of standing
but focused on whether any of the plaintiffs presented a ripe
controversy.7

Ripeness prevents courts from "entangling

themselves in abstract disagreements."
387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).

Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,

"[R]uling on federal constitutional

matters in advance of the necessity of deciding them [is to be
avoided], to postpone judicial review where it would be
premature."

Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 413.

The ripeness

determination "evaluate[s] both the fitness of the issues for
judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding
court consideration."

Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149.

Ultimately, the case must involve "'a real and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a
conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.'"
North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (quotation
omitted).
7

"A federal court's jurisdiction therefore can be

. The district court did opine, however, that "even if the
Church's members were parties, nothing in the record indicates
any realistic threat that the state will enforce the amendments
against them." Presbytery II, 830 F. Supp. at 249. That
conclusion is open to doubt considering the state's refusal to
negate in its affidavit an intention to enforce the statute
against members of the Orthodox Presbyterian denomination in
their secular activities.

invoked only when the plaintiff himself has suffered 'some
threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal
action . . . .'"

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)

(citation omitted).
As Professor Chemerinsky recognizes, "[r]ipeness
properly should be understood as involving the question of when
may a party seek preenforcement review of a statute or
regulation."

Chemerinsky, supra, at 100 (emphasis in original).

Thus, it is not surprising that the ripeness inquiry often
involves declaratory actions which present special problems.

See

Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270 273
(1941) ("Basically, the question in each case is whether the
facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a
substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the
issuance of a declaratory judgment.").
We have adopted a three part test in determining
whether we will engage in preenforcement review in the context of
a declaratory action; specifically, we examine "the adversity of
the interest of the parties, the conclusiveness of the judicial
judgment and the practical help, or utility, of that judgment."
Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 912 F.2d 643, 647 (3d
Cir. 1990); see also Armstrong, 961 F.2d. at 412-24 (applying
test while noting that factors are not exclusive).
On the first part, adversity of interest, we have
observed, "'[f]or there to be an actual controversy[,] the
defendant must be so situated that the parties have adverse legal

interests.'"

Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 648 (quoting 10A Charles

Wright, Arthur Miller & Mary Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 2757, at 582-83 (2d ed. 1983)).

Although the party seeking

review need not have suffered a "completed harm" to establish
adversity of interest, Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 412, it is
necessary that there be a substantial threat of real harm and
that the threat "must remain 'real and immediate' throughout the
course of the litigation."

Salvation Army v. Department of

Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 1990).

Thus, where

intervening events remove the possibility of harm, "the court
must not address the now-speculative controversy."

Id.; see also

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983) (threatened injury must be
"certainly impending").
Second, the parties must not only retain adverse
interests throughout the litigation, but "[a]ny contest must be
based on a 'real and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon
a hypothetical state of facts.'"

Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 649

(quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241
(1937)).

"A declaratory judgment granted in the absence of a

concrete set of facts would itself be a 'contingency,' and
applying it to actual controversies which subsequently arise
would be an 'exercise in futility.'"
(quoting Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 648).

Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 412
The requirement of

concreteness has some play in the joints.

We have noted, "the

need for a concrete set of facts is greater in some instances
than others."

Id.

For example, an "actual factual setting" is

"particularly important in cases raising allegations of an
unconstitutional taking," id. (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 294-95 (1981)), whereas
facts are not so important where the question is "predominantly
legal."

Id. (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 201).
The third part of the test, utility of the judgment, is

important because "[o]ne of the primary purposes behind the
Declaratory Judgment Act was to enable plaintiffs to preserve the
status quo . . ., and a case should not be considered justiciable
unless 'the court is convinced that [by its action] a useful
purpose will be served.'"

Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 649 (quoting

E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 29, 58 (1941)).

Thus, with

these three inquiries in mind, we turn to an analysis of whether
the district court erred by determining this case did not present
a ripe controversy.

1.

Adversity of interest

In Armstrong we said, "[w]here the plaintiff's action
is based on a contingency, it is unlikely that the parties'
interest will be sufficiently adverse to give rise to a case or
controversy within the meaning of Article III."
F.2d at 411-12.

Armstrong, 961

In concluding that the instant case was not ripe

for adjudication, the district court relied in large part on the
representations of the DCR through the Stewart affidavit and a
history of the LAD's non-enforcement against religiously

motivated speakers.

Thus, in terms of the Step-Saver test, the

district court determined that the parties had no adverse
interest.

Despite Cummings' assertion that he has engaged, does

engage and will engage in prohibited discrimination, the court
stated:
[N]o enforcement action or private suit has
been commenced against [Cummings or the other
plaintiffs] as a result. Moreover, although
Plaintiffs allege that they intend to engage
in similar conduct in the future, without an
actual or imminent threat of enforcement of
the statute the constitutional issues are not
presented in a sufficiently "'clean-cut and
concrete form'" to render this action ripe.'"
See [Renne], 111 S. Ct. at 2339.
Plaintiffs argue that this case is ripe
because, although Defendants have conceded
that they will not enforce the LAD against
the institutional plaintiffs, they have not
waived enforcement of the statute against
Cummings or against the Church's individual
members. The Court, however, disagrees with
Plaintiffs' interpretation of Defendants'
waiver as not including a waiver of
enforcement against Cummings. The
Defendants, recognizing the First Amendment
concerns raised in this action, have
represented that the LAD does not apply to
and will not be enforced against Plaintiffs'
religious worship, beliefs, practice, speech
or refusal to speak. See Stewart Aff.,
¶¶ 10-13. This Court reads these statements
as clearly including Plaintiff Cummings.
Accordingly, the Court sees no possibility of
state enforcement against him.

Presbytery II, 830 F. Supp. at 248-49.
The state argues that the district court correctly held
that none of the named plaintiffs face an imminent threat that
the LAD's prohibitions against incitement or otherwise inducing

or helping others to induce boycotts, any of its other
prohibitions against discrimination or its notice posting
requirement will be enforced against them.

In support, the state

contends that the complaint and its allegations refer to Cummings
only in his capacity as pastor of an Orthodox Presbyterian
Church.

Because it has waived enforcement against the plaintiffs

when they act in their capacity as religious organizations or as
clergymen performing religious functions, the state concludes
that Cummings does not face any imminent threat of enforcement,
but yet refuses to guarantee that he will not be prosecuted if he
acts as an individual outside the church.
Applying the usual standards for construing the
allegations of a complaint which give the plaintiff the benefit
of all favorable inferences that can be drawn from them,8 we
conclude that the complaint fairly asserts Reverend Cummings'
rights as both a pastor and a citizen and therefore that the
Stewart affidavit is insufficient to remove the threat of
enforcement against Cummings in his individual capacity.
In order to determine what rights Cummings asserts, we
turn to the amended complaint.
precise information.

Complaints need not be models of

Rather, a complaint suffices when it serves

fairly to notify the defendants of the facts and the alleged
deprivation.

See, e.g., Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d

188, 194 (3d Cir. 1993).

8

Moreover, when judged on their face,

. See Markowitz v. Northeast Land Company, 906 F.2d 100, 103
(3d Cir. 1990).

complaints should be construed in favor of the party defending
against a motion to dismiss.

Cf. id. ("The test in reviewing a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is whether, under
any reasonable reading of the pleadings, plaintiff may be
entitled to relief.") (citing Colburn v. Upper Darby Township,
838 F.2d 663, 665-66 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065
(1989)); Williams v. New Castle County, 970 F.2d 1260, 1266 (3d
Cir. 1992).
The state contends that the complaint asserts Cummings'
rights only in terms of his institutional capacity.

A careful

review of the record, however, reveals a different conclusion.
Although it is helpful for a complaint to specify if a party is
bringing suit in his individual or official capacity, we are not
aware of any rigid rule that requires an express statement of
such capacity.

We recognize that Cummings is listed as the "Rev.

David B. Cummings" in the caption of the complaint, App. at 195,
but his participation is nowhere limited to his institutional
capacity.9

Again, in paragraph 4 of the complaint, Cummings is

identified as being an ordained minister of the Presbytery, the
pastor of one of its New Jersey churches and a plaintiff, but no
9

. Use of the term "Reverend" in written documents is generally
a respectful acknowledgment of the clergyman's calling or
profession. In the same way persons in other professions are
respectfully addressed as "doctor," "attorney," "professor," etc.
At oral argument, appellants' counsel stated he listed Cummings
as the "Rev. David B. Cummings" in the caption "because that is
his title." Transcript of Oral Argument, March 25, 1994 ("Tr.")
at 5. He also indicated that if a pastor is suing in an official
capacity he normally would add "as pastor of such and such" in
the caption. Id.

mention is made of his suing only as a leader of an institution.
In paragraph 14, Cummings is described without limitation to his
capacity as a clergyman or religious leader.

In paragraph 51,

the complaint states:
Plaintiff Cummings, other pastors and
members of their congregations . . . do speak
out about homosexuality, bisexuality and
heterosexual sex outside of marriage, make
reasonable distinctions based on such
practices, lobby against them, and circulate
literature condemning them. They encourage,
aid and abet discrimination and reasonable
distinctions against homosexuals, bisexuals
and heterosexuals engaging in sex outside of
marriage.

App. at 218. Paragraph 53 of the complaint alleges:
[P]laintiffs publish, circulate, issue,
display, post and mail printed material
condemning homosexuality, bisexuality and
heterosexual sex outside of marriage, making
reasonable distinctions based on such acts
. . . .

Id.

Paragraph 57 of the complaint alleges:
Plaintiffs have always in the past,
presently do and since the amendments have
refused to knowingly buy from, contract with
or otherwise do business with persons on the
basis of that person's homosexual, bisexual
or heterosexual practices.

Id. at 220.

None of these allegations limit the acts Cummings

avers he wishes to perform without fear of prosecution or
reprisal under the LAD to acts he would perform only as a pastor
of the OPC.

Rather, the clear implication of these allegations,

when we construe them in favor of the plaintiff, as we must, is

that Cummings has in the past, currently does and in the future
will engage in conduct both in his professional and personal life
that could run afoul of the statute.

We see nothing in the

complaint that would support the state's conclusion that Cummings
asserts only his right to preach and teach within the confines of
the church as a clergyman or religious leader.

To the contrary,

the portions of the complaint just quoted indicate that Cummings,
as an individual, plans to engage in conduct that has a potential
for violating the LAD's ban on incitement of prohibited
discrimination against male or female homosexuals in employment,
commerce and places of public accommodation by boycott or
otherwise.10

Thus, provided that a threat of enforcement

10

. In an affidavit submitted in support of his opposition to
summary judgment, Cummings specifically reaffirmed certain
paragraphs of the complaint. He omitted, however, paragraphs
alleging the intention to engage in prohibited conduct outside
the church. The state argues that this omission indicates that
Cummings does not intend to engage in such conduct outside the
institutional setting therefore removing the possibility of
prosecution.
We do not think that Cummings' failure to specifically
reference the relevant paragraphs of the complaint is tantamount
to a disavowal of their content. If, during the pendency of the
litigation, Cummings were to disavow his intention to engage in
proscribed conduct, that disavowal could deprive this case of
ripeness. See Salvation Army, 919 F.2d at 192. At this
preliminary juncture, however, we are advised Cummings intends to
prove at trial the allegations contained in the complaint. At
oral argument this intention was reiterated by his counsel,
speaking as an officer of the court. Absent strong indications
that the allegations of the complaint have been disavowed, we are
reluctant to hold a first amendment freedom of expression claim
is not ripe when the complaint adequately alleges that claim,
without considering Cummings' standing to assert the chilling
affect of the statute's prohibitions on freedom of expression,
and we are equally reluctant to consider the standing issue on
this record.

restricting Cummings' First Amendment right of free speech
exists, the controversy would be ripe.

Focusing solely on the

question of ripeness, however, it would not be sufficient for the
complaint merely to assert Cummings' rights as a citizen.

There

must remain a credible threat of enforcement against him even
though representations were made by the state in its affidavit
disclaiming any intention to enforce the statute against
religious institutions.
We have held that "[i]n order to present a justiciable
controversy in an action seeking a declaratory judgment to
protect against a feared future event, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the probability of that future event occurring
is real and substantial, 'of sufficient immediacy and reality to
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgement.'"

Salvation

Army, 919 F.2d at 192 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,
460 (1974)).

"Where the plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment

with respect to the constitutionality of a state statute, even
where the attack is on First Amendment grounds, there must be a
'real and immediate' threat of enforcement against the
plaintiff."

Id. (quoting Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202,

1206-07 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 478 U.S. 186
(1986)).

This threat must remain extant throughout the course of

the litigation and "[w]here an intervening event removes these
conditions, the court must not address the now-speculative
controversy."

Id. (citing Steffel, 415 U.S. at 459 n.10

(remanding for determination of whether plaintiff still faced
threat of prosecution)).

In paragraph 12 of the Stewart affidavit, the state has
forsworn enforcement of the LAD with respect to church employment
decisions.

Stewart then states,
Under this provision [regarding church
employment practices], the plaintiffs here
are free, without fear of prosecution, to
make employment decisions which discriminate
respecting a current or prospective
employee's actual or perceived sexual
orientation. Hence, such a "religious
association or organization" may make
decisions and engage in the practice of its
sincerely-held religious beliefs within the
limits only of the First Amendment. The
Division has not and has no intention of
construing nor enforcing the LAD in any
manner which, liberally construed, would even
tend or threaten to violate the sincere
"tenets" of any religion. Moreover, the
Division has not and has no intention to
engage in any determination or judgment as to
what is or is not a "religious activity" of a
church, or to determine what is or is not a
"tenet" of religious faith.

App. at 295-96.

Although this paragraph could fairly be

construed to remove the threat of enforcement against the church
and its religious activities, we think it fails to eschew
enforcement against speech or expressive conduct outside the
setting of a religious institution or office.

Similarly, in

paragraph 13 of his affidavit, Stewart avers that "the Division
has not in the past prosecuted and has no intention to prosecute
essentially exempt churches for sincerely-held religious belief
or practice, or speech consistent with such belief, or for a
refusal to engage in certain speech or for following their
religious tenets, all within only the limits of the First

Amendment."

Id. at 296 (emphasis added).

Moreover, at oral

argument before this court, the state pointedly limited the scope
of the immunity it offered:
THE COURT: Do you agree with [plaintiffs'
counsel's] interpretation of your affidavit?
MR. LORENTZ: That the state has not waived
enforcement against unnamed individuals, and
against Reverend Cummings in his role outside
of pastor because there's nothing in the
complaint or anywhere in the case that
indicates that he has any other role.
Certainly, he is an individual.

Tr. at 25-26.11
The literal terms of the DCR waiver go no farther than
the religious activities of the institutional plaintiffs and at
oral argument, counsel reiterated the limits of the waiver in

11

.

The colloquy continues:
THE COURT: But [appellants] argued this
morning . . . that the title of "Reverend" in
that [sic] complaints is only descriptive in
that he still remains as an individual
plaintiff. Now is that sophistry or is there
some merit to that?
MR. LORENTZ: It is not our--we don't
understand that the thrust of the attack that
was launched on the statute originally before
it was severely constricted was anything but
by an institution.
Obviously, because institutional
protection of religion is greater under the
first amendment than it is for individuals.
Individuals are required to obey laws of
general application.

Tr. at 26.

this respect.

It is nevertheless also the state's position that

the case is not ripe absent an actual prosecution.

That is not

the law.
In Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), the United
States Supreme Court held that where a plaintiff seeks to
exercise the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of
expression, the state need not prosecute in order to present a
ripe controversy.

Id. at 459.

In Steffel, the plaintiff

attempted to distribute handbills in a shopping center protesting
the United States's involvement in Vietnam.

Id. at 455.

After a

prior encounter with police, plaintiff returned with a companion.
Id.

The police arrived and informed the protestors that if they

remained, they would be arrested.

Id.

his companion stayed and was arrested.

Plaintiff left although
Id. at 456.

Plaintiff

then commenced an injunctive and declaratory action claiming the
law interfered with his First Amendment right.

Id. at 454-55.

The state argued the case was not ripe because there was no
prosecution.

The Supreme Court disagreed.

"In these

circumstances, it is not necessary that petitioner first expose
himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to
challenge a statute that he claims deters the exercise of his
constitutional rights."

Id. at 459; see also McKay v. Heyison,

614 F.2d 899, 904 (3d Cir. 1980) ("'When the plaintiff has
alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct, arguably
affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a
statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution
thereunder, he "should not be required to await and undergo a

criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief."'"
(quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S.
289, 298 (1979) (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 180
(1973))); Chemerinsky, supra at 103 ("[I]t is well established
that a case is ripe because of the substantial hardship to
denying preenforcement review when a person is forced to choose
between forgoing possibly lawful activity and risking substantial
sanctions.").
We recognize that Steffel differs from the instant
case.

There the state demonstrated its willingness to prosecute

others.

This added immediacy to Steffel's claim that he faced

prosecution if he engaged in proscribed expressive activity.
Here the state has forsworn prosecution of Cummings in his
clerical role, but it has refused to forswear his prosecution if
he were to step off the pulpit and engage in the activities he
alleges his first amendment right to freedom of expression
protects.

The pointed nature of that refusal, both in the

state's affidavit and at oral argument indicates to us that
Reverend Cummings and others who engage in the expressive
activity he describes face a real threat of prosecution.

In

short, to the extent this record eliminates any free exercise
claims as unripe it does not do so with respect to the individual
free expression claims Cummings appears to advance.

Here, the

state has had ample opportunity to indicate that it will not

prosecute religiously motivated speakers under the aid and abet
or boycott provisions.

It has elected not to do so.12

Accordingly, in light of the state's refusal to waive
prosecution against Cummings when he acts outside of his
institutional capacity as a pastor of the OPC, we conclude the
threat of prosecution is "real and substantial," see Salvation
Army, 919 F.2d at 192, and at least the presence of Reverend
Cummings as a plaintiff in this law suit presents interests
sufficiently adverse to those of the state so as to satisfy the
first prong of the Step-Saver inquiry.

2.

Conclusiveness

The second Step-Saver factor requires us to determine
whether judicial action at the present time would amount to more
than an advisory opinion based upon a hypothetical set of facts.
See Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 649.

As mentioned supra,

predominantly legal questions are generally amenable to a
conclusive determination in a preenforcement context; however,
"plaintiffs raising predominantly legal claims must still meet
the minimum requirements for Article III jurisdiction."
12

. The state contends that its waiver was crafted in terms of
the institutional plaintiffs alone because the state considered
the plaintiffs to be litigating in their institutional capacity
alone and that its waiver should not be read too narrowly. The
responses of counsel at oral argument before us, however, show
the state still refuses to waive prosecution outside the
religious setting once the plaintiffs made it clear that they
sought to assert Cummings' rights as an individual. See supra
typescript note 10. We have already rejected the contention
supra typescript at 21-24 that the complaint fails to invoke the
private rights of Reverend Cummings.

Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 421 (citing Office of Communication of
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 826 F.2d 101, 105 (D.C. Cir.
1987) ("[T]he presence of 'a purely legal question' is not
enough, of itself, to render a case ripe for judicial review, not
even as to that issue.")).
In Armstrong, we approved a rationale used by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in
Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. United States Department of Energy, 666
F.2d 1359 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 836 (1982).

In

Atlanta Gas Light, the court held that its conclusion of ripeness
was supported by factors which included the fact that the
parties' claims would not substantially change in future
litigation, that the current parties were appropriate to raise
the issues at bar and that the parties would be subject to
enforcement of the challenged act were it implemented.

See id.

at 1363 n.7.
Here, we see no reason why disposition of this case
could not conclusively determine the largely legal issues at
stake.

Factual development would not add much to the plaintiffs'

facial challenges to the constitutionality of the statute.

To

the extent that it is not distinguishable, we are unpersuaded by
Voluntary Association of Religious Leaders v. Waihee, 800
F. Supp. 882 (D. Haw. 1992), where the court determined that a
challenge similar to one now before us was not factually
developed adequately enough to make the case ripe for
disposition.

Id. at 890.

There, the plaintiffs challenged an

amendment to an anti-discrimination statute that added sexual

orientation to the protected categories and made it illegal "to
aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce" any of the discriminatory
practices listed by the statute.

Id. at 884.

The plaintiffs,

who included a minister and a parishioner, "fail[ed] to allege
that they are engaging in, or plan to engage in, any activities
that would subject them to enforcement."

Id. at 888.

The court

concluded that a vague allegation that a minister would preach to
his employees about the evils of homosexuality was insufficient
to pose any clear threat that he would be prosecuted under the
statute.

Id. at 888-89.

To the extent, however, that the court

concluded that a facial challenge to a statute that seeks to
proscribe otherwise protected First Amendment conduct such as
oral advocacy and boycott is not ripe until a concrete factual
situation is before the court, see id. at 890, we disagree.
Presumably, in order to give the court in Waihee a concrete
factual situation, a prosecution would first be necessary.

We

believe that Steffel teaches that a plaintiff need not choose
between prosecution and stifling otherwise protected activities.
Furthermore, the Waihee court relied on the Supreme
Court decision in Renne.

Id.

Renne involved a challenge to a

California law that prohibited political parties from endorsing
candidates for non-partisan offices.

Renne, 501 U.S. at 315.

The Court there held that the plaintiffs' allegations that they
sought to endorse officials in the future was insufficient to
render the case ripe.

Id. at 321.

Here, unlike Renne, Cummings alleges that he currently
engages in speech and acts allegedly circumscribed by the LAD and

that he will continue to do so in the future.

Even if this case

were finally dismissed as not ripe, Reverend Cummings or others
who share his beliefs could in the future easily assert
substantially similar facial attacks on the LAD in their
individual capacities.

Such claims would most likely parallel

those claims already presented in the present action, and as such
it is unlikely that there would be any change in the substance or
clarity of the challenges to the LAD.

Furthermore, if the LAD is

enforced against private citizens and Reverend Cummings engages
in the acts alleged in paragraphs 49, 51, 57, and 69 of the
complaint, in his individual capacity, he would appear to be
exposed to a threat of enforcement.

Reverend Cummings appears to

be an appropriate party to raise the first amendment freedom of
expression objections to the provisions of the LAD set out in the
claim.

Thus, the principles discussed in Atlanta Gas Light

support a conclusion that this case is ripe if Reverend Cummings
has at this point expressed enough of an adverse interest to the
provisions of the LAD he refers to in the complaint to permit
this case to go forward.
Indeed, it is hard to see how a more concrete factual
situation would aid resolution of the plaintiffs' First Amendment
free speech challenge to the statute.
412.

See Armstrong, 961 F.2d at

Such factual development is of minimal assistance in facial

challenges such as this.

Present resolution of the facial

challenge would completely and decisively determine whether the
amendments to the LAD that the plaintiffs object to affect the
fundamental right of free speech the First Amendment protects.

Accordingly, we believe the second Step-Saver element also favors
holding the controversy to be ripe.

3.

Utility

The final Step-Saver factor focuses on the utility
served by current entry of a judgment resolving the facial
challenge to the Act.

In this inquiry we consider "whether the

parties' plans of actions are likely to be affected by a
declaratory judgment."

Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 649 n.9.

It appears to us that entry of a declaratory judgment
deciding the free speech issues the LAD amendments pose in the
instant case would be useful to the parties and others who could
be affected.

Although Cummings alleges that he will engage in

allegedly prohibited conduct in the future, we assume his
willingness to do so is likely to be affected by resolution of
this action.13

Similarly, the state's effort to enforce certain

portions of the amended LAD will be affected by the resolution of
this litigation.

Unlike the plaintiffs in Armstrong who "d[id]

not face the threat of sanction for noncompliance with [the
challenged act]," Cummings does.

Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 423.

A

declaration of his rights and those of all others who would seek
to engage in similar activity would permit a person to speak

13

. Current First Amendment jurisprudence does not require a
Thoreau or a Gandhi who is willing to go to jail for his beliefs
but permits the more cautious Emersons among us to assert our
fears of interference with our this country's fundamental rights
in the civilized atmosphere of a court before subjecting
ourselves to the risk of arrest and jail.

without fear of governmental sanction or regulation of their
activities protected by the statute.
Accordingly, we conclude that a grant or denial of
relief in this case would materially affect the parties and thus
this Step-Saver factor also weighs in favor of our conclusion
that this controversy is ripe.

We express no opinion on the

merits of this case, a task that involves the meaning and
interpretation of the statutory provisions under attack and their
effect on our fundamental constitutional right to freedom of
speech.

We think that task should be performed by the district

court in the first instance.
We therefore conclude that Reverend Cummings has
demonstrated a ripe controversy under the three factor test set
forth in Step-Saver.

Because the state's representation

regarding enforcement does not eliminate the threat of
enforcement against plaintiff Cummings and Cummings has averred
that he does and will engage in potentially violative conduct,
the parties present adverse interests in this dispute.

Moreover,

a final resolution of this dispute would be both conclusive on
the issue and of practical help to those who seek to engage in
potentially protected activity.

We hold, therefore, that the

district court erred in dismissing the action as unripe.14
14

. Our reasons for so concluding also establish Cummings'
standing to assert a violation of his First Amendment rights. In
order for a party to present a justiciable controversy, the
litigant must be "entitled to have the court decide the merits of
the dispute or of particular issues." Warth v. Selden, 422 U.S.
490, 498 (1975). At a constitutional minimum, the litigant
seeking the intervention of the federal court:

(..continued)
must demonstrate three things: (1) "injury
in fact," by which we mean an invasion of a
legally protected interest that is "(a)
concrete and particularized, and (b) actual
or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical"[;] (2) a causal relationship
between the injury and the challenged
conduct, by which we mean that the injury
"fairly can be traced to the challenged
action of the defendant," and has not
resulted "from the independent action of some
third party not before the court"[;] and (3)
a likelihood that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision, by which
we mean that the "prospect of obtaining
relief from the injury as a result of a
favorable ruling" is not "too speculative[.]"
Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v.
City of Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2301-02 (1993). It is
clear that Cummings can assert his own rights as an individual
and, in light of our conclusion that the state has not foregone
the threat of prosecuting Cummings for what he claims are the
expressive activities he wishes to engage in as a citizen, we
conclude Cummings has standing without reference to the
plaintiff's standing to assert the First Amendment rights of
others whose expressive activities may be chilled by the threat
of prosecution under the LAD.

V.
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the order of
the district court dismissing Reverend Cummings first amendment
freedom of expression claims for lack of jurisdiction and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The

state's representations clearly show that the claims of the
institutional plaintiffs, Presbytery and Calvary are not ripe.
Stewart, the Director of the Division on Civil Rights in the
Department of Law and Public Safety of the State of New Jersey
and an officer of the court swears:

"[the State] . . . has no

intention to prosecute essentially exempt churches for sincerelyheld religious belief or practice, or speech consistent with such
belief . . . .

[T]his would include N.J.S.A. 10:5-12c, N.J.S.A.

10:5-12e, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12j, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12 l and N.J.S.A.
10:5-12m."

App. at 296-97.

Therefore, we will affirm the

district court's decision as it applies to the institutional
plaintiffs.

RE:

THE PRESBYTERY OF NEW JERSEY OF THE ORTHODOX PRESBYTERIAN
CHURCH, et al., Appellants v. JAMES FLORIO, GOVERNOR OF
NEW JERSEY, et al., No. 93-5559

_________________________________________________________________

ROSENN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
The majority correctly concludes that this suit is not
ripe with respect to the institutional parties.

However, I

disagree with the majority's conclusion that "the controversy is
ripe" because Rev. David Cummings arguably alleges as an
individual that the statute threatens his right of speech.

This

conclusion ignores completely the allegations in the complaint
that he is suing as the pastor of the Orthodox Presbyterian
Church of New Jersey.

I therefore respectfully dissent because I

believe this case is not ripe for judicial disposition.
Article III, section 2 of the United States
Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to actual "cases" and
"controversies." U.S. Const. art III § 2.
issuance of advisory opinions.

Thus, it forbids the

"The case or controversy

requirement must be met regardless of the type of relief sought,
including declaratory relief." Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v.
Adams, 961 F.2d 405, 410 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
Additionally, "even if a declaratory judgment would clarify the
parties' legal rights, it should ordinarily not be granted unless
`the parties' plans of actions are likely to be affected by a
declaratory judgment.'" Id. at 412 (citation omitted).

Also, in

cases concerning the Constitutionality of state statutes, this

court should consider "the advantage of permitting state courts
further opportunity to construe the challenged provision and
perhaps in the process materially alter the question to be
decided." Id. (citation omitted) (quotation
omitted).

Finally, this court must presume that it lacks

jurisdiction unless the record affirmatively demonstrates that
jurisdiction exists; i.e. the plaintiff must persuade this court
that jurisdiction exists. Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316
(1991).
Federal courts consider three primary factors when
reviewing a declaratory judgment action for ripeness:

(1)

adversity of interest between plaintiffs and defendants, (2)
conclusivity, and (3) utility.

Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v.

Wyse Technology, 912 F.2d 643, 647 (3d Cir. 1990).15

The court

weighs these and other relevant factors to determine if the issue
is ripe.

Here, the case is not ripe because no adversity of

interest exists between the parties involved in this suit in
light of the extensive protection afforded by New Jersey's Law
Against Discrimination (LAD) from interference with plaintiffs'
religious practices.

Moreover, the Director of New Jersey's

Division on Civil Rights has represented that the State has not
in the past prosecuted and has no intention to prosecute exempt
religious organizations for religious beliefs, practices, or

15

. See, majority opinion at 14-19 for a thorough and
informative discussion of ripeness jurisprudence.

speech.

Therefore, the conclusiveness and utility of a judgment

rendered at this time are doubtful.
The majority correctly notes that the State of New
Jersey has expressed its intention not to prosecute Rev. Cummings
for actions taken as a member of the clergy engaging in the
performance of religious functions and that the State has refused
to waive enforcement of LAD against Cummings as an individual.
The majority properly concludes that Cummings cannot pursue this
suit as a representative of the church.

The majority, however,

strains in an effort to conclude that Cummings has sued in his
individual capacity and in that capacity can pursue this case.
Cummings is clearly identified in the complaint as
"Rev. David B. Cummings." see e.g., plaintiffs' caption in First
Amended Complaint and ¶¶ 1 and 4.

The complaint does not allege

that he sues in a secular capacity as an individual church
member.

Moreover, when this court heard an earlier appeal in

this same case on an appeal from an order denying the plaintiffs'
application for a preliminary injunction, its memorandum opinion
addressed Cummings only in his role as "an ordained minister of
the Presbytery and the pastor of one of its member churches." In
that appeal, appellants did not maintain that Cummings was acting
as an individual and appellants have never amended their
complaint to include Cummings or others as individual plaintiffs.
Paragraph 4 of the complaint in this case specifically avers:
"plaintiff, Rev. David B. Cummings, is an ordained minister of

the Presbytery, and the pastor of one of its New Jersey
churches."

No reference is made to him as an individual.

If any

residual question still remains at this point as to Cummings'
status in this litigation, it is dissipated by paragraph 45 of
the complaint.

It states:

"[t]he individual plaintiff

[Cummings] is an agent of these entities [the churches]."
The majority does not point to any
describes Cummings as an individual.16

language that

In fact, the first of the

three paragraphs from the complaint quoted by the majority in
support of their conclusion begins "[p]laintiff Cummings, other
pastors and members of their congregations . . . ."
complaint (emphasis added).

¶ 51 of

The plaintiffs' use of the words

"other pastors" immediately after "plaintiff Cummings" confirms
that Cummings is acting as a pastor in this litigation and not as
an individual.

The additional paragraphs from the complaint

quoted by the majority contain references to actions by
"plaintiffs" without providing any evidence that the referenced
"plaintiffs" include any individuals.
The district court observed that the individual members
of the appellant churches were not plaintiffs in this action.
Presbytery of N.J. of Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 830
F.Supp 241, 249 (D.N.J. 1993).
observation.
16

The record supports this

First, the complaint's caption lists only one

. Interestingly, of the three paragraphs quoted by the
majority, Cummings only adopts paragraph 53 in his Affidavit in
support of the complaint.

individual, Reverend Cummings.17

Second, the record contains no

information demonstrating that any of the church members are
represented by the named plaintiffs or have consented to
inclusion in this law suit.18

The district court properly noted

that a ripe declaratory judgment action requires "a `real and
immediate' threat of enforcement against the plaintiff." 830
F.Supp at 249 (quoting Salvation Army v. Department of Community
Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 1990) (emphasis added by
district court).
representative.

Cummings brought this suit as an institutional
After the State's affidavit averred that it

would not prosecute him under LAD for actions taken as a pastor,
no legitimate case or controversy remained.
Even if Cummings had pursued this case as an individual
from the beginning, it is not ripe.

"Where the plaintiff seeks a

declaratory judgment with respect to the constitutionality of a
state statute, even where the attack is on First Amendment
grounds, there must be a `real and immediate' threat of
17

. I do not agree with the majority's supposition that
"Reverend" is used as a purely honorary term. In the context of
this litigation, where the plaintiffs have carefully shielded
Cummings from the possibility of counter-claims and the
assessment of costs, "Reverend" is used precisely; it signifies
Cummings' role as an institutional representative and separates
Cummings the church representative, the plaintiff in this case,
from Cummings the individual.
18

. On appeal, appellant contends that they are acting on behalf
of their church members. However, they have provided no
persuasive evidence to support this contention; mere references
to church members within the body of the complaint are
insufficient.

enforcement."

Salvation Army, 919 F.2d at 192 (quoting Hardwick

v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1206-7 (11th Cir. 1985)).

Nothing in

the record demonstrates any realistic threat that the state will
enforce the amendments against Cummings as an individual.

The

State has merely refused to waive its right to prosecute
Cummings; it has not taken any steps to prosecute him or anyone
else under LAD.

In a careful analysis, the able and experienced

district judge noted that "[t]he plaintiffs' professed fears of
state enforcement of the LAD against their members appear to be
based only on imagination or speculation, which is insufficient
to create a ripe controversy." 830 F.Supp at 249 (citation
omitted).
Despite the State's refusal to waive enforcement of the
LAD against Cummings and other members of the congregation as
individuals, the record supports the district court's finding
that there is no realistic threat that the State will enforce the
law against them.

In the almost two years since the LAD became

effective, neither the State nor any private individual has filed
a complaint against a church member.

Moreover, the district

court found that the threat of an administrative or private suit
has not had any discernible effect on their conduct.
at 249.

830 F.Supp

To the contrary, the plaintiffs concede that since the

enactment of the LAD in 1992, they have discriminated and spoken
out against people based on their sexual orientation.

The court

thus found that the prospect that the plaintiffs will alter their

actions out of fear of a suit under the LAD is highly unlikely.
830 F.Supp at 249. See Salvation Army, 919 F.2d at 193.
The plaintiffs have not demonstrated a real and
substantial probability that the litigation they fear will occur;
almost two years have passed since the LAD became effective and
no private suit or administrative complaint has been filed.
Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 412.

See

Additionally, the district court

found that there is "no credible evidence that any person or
organization is contemplating such an action." 830 F.Supp at 249.
The theoretical possibility that someone may file such a suit at
some time in the future is not sufficient to render this action
ripe.

See Salvation Army, 919 F.2d at 193.

Moreover, this court

has noted that the relief the plaintiffs seek would not bind
unidentified private parties and protect plaintiffs from private
suits.
In addition to showing that the issues in this case are
not fit for judicial decision, the record also shows that the
withholding of an opinion at this time will not work a hardship
on the parties.

Despite the plaintiffs' arguments to the

contrary, they will suffer no "immediate and significant"
hardship from the district court's decision not to adjudicate
this action at this time.

See Felmeister v. Office of Attorney

Ethics, Div. of New Jersey Administrative Office of Courts, 856
F.2d 529, 537 (3d Cir. 1988).

The court found that the

plaintiffs have not changed their behavior due to the LAD

amendments, that defendants will not subject the plaintiffs to an
enforcement action, and that private enforcement of the statute
against the plaintiffs is uncertain.

Thus, the court did not err

in concluding that its withholding of an opinion will not work a
hardship on the plaintiffs.
Regardless how one views the merits of the amendments
to the LAD, there is no reason whatsoever why this court should
struggle to construct a theoretical controversy where none
exists.

Under the three Step-Saver factors, this case is not

ripe for resolution.

Therefore, I would affirm the order of the

district court dismissing plaintiffs' action.

